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Book Reviews
Section 1983: Sword and Shield
Edited by Robert H. Freilich and
Richard G. Carlisle
Section of Urban, State, and Local Government
Law, American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th
Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637; 1983; 478 pages;
Index; $35; paperback.
ROBERT H. FREILICH AND RICHARD G. CARLISLE have collected
sixteen essays from Volumes 11 through 15 of The Urban
Lawyer-the journal which has most consistently followed de-
velopments in the law of section 19831-and published them as
Section 1983: Sword and Shield.2 Prepared for the Section of
Urban, State, and Local Government Law of the American Bar
Association, this helpful volume provides a contemporary history
of the development of the 1871 Civil Rights Act,3 from which
section 1983 was derived.
The Urban Lawyer's unique obsession with the old civil rights
act began with the eleventh volume in 1979 as in the preceding year
the Supreme Court caught section members' attention by making
municipal and other local governments liable in damages under
section 1983 for many constitutional violations committed by their
officials. Reversing the only serious restriction read into the statute
when the Court originally resurrected it in Monroe v. Pape,4 a
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). The section provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person
within the jurisidiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
2. The reviewer wishes to disclose his friendship with the authors, the fact of
which explains why it would be fulsome to praise this work. This review, there-
fore, seeks more to inform about the book's contents and section 1983's problems
then to evaluate the former.
3. 1871 Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
4. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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majority in Monell v. Department of Social Services' held that a city
is a "person" able to cause deprivations of federal rights. That
decision led in turn to a series of totally unforeseen developments
as the reputedly conservative Burger Court transmuted into the
Brennan Court and broadly construed section 1983 to provide
even further opportunities for federal judicial intervention against
errant governments and their officers.
Sword and Shield provides a sustained introduction to section
1983 for the interested and inquiring practitioner. These are con-
sistently useful essays. Some are scholarly in tone, but most speak
more directly to practicing municipal attorneys who need the
volume's information and insights.
The articles collected in Sword and Shield cover substantially all
of the post-Monell developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Freilich and Carlisle themselves have written about Monell and its
aftermath,6 including the Owen v. City of Independence rejection7
of immunity for municipalities similar to the immunity accorded
officials.8 Works by Kramer, Weeks, Kushnir, and Peters also
cover these developments. The specter of municipal liability raised
by Monell grew more intense when the Court in Maine v.
Thiboutot9 initially read the "and laws" language in section 1983 to
permit suits not only for violation of constitutional norms, but also
deviation from federal statutorily prescribed standards, such as
those in welfare statutes and other grant and contract legislation. 10
5. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
6. Three new introductory pieces, not previously published, provide an overall
introduction to the several articles collected. Carlisle, Section 1983: The Preemi-
nent Issue-A Species of Tort or Statutory Liability in SECTION 1983 SWORD AND
SHIELD 3 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle eds. 1983) (introducing tort background of
§ 1983); Jeans, The Symposium Articles and Six Major Issues of Section 1983 in
SWORD AND SHIELD, at 13 (describing format of book); Lansford,
Comment: Municipal Liability under the Ku Klux Klan Act.of1871-an Historical
Perspective in SWORD AND SHIELD, at 23 (historical introduction to interpretation
of § 1983).
7. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
8. See id. at 638; cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (immunities for
real persons); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
9. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 509-12 (1st Cir. 1983) (relief
granted in social security case). But see Boatowners and Tenants' Ass'n v. Port of
Seattle, 716 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1983). Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981), the lower federal courts have narrowed the list of collateral statutes which
can be enforced through section 1983, and thus have alleviated the fears raised in
Thiboutot. Boatowners, supra, at 671-73 (collecting cases).
Robert Manley's and Richard Cappalli's articles on this topic are
among the most literate and thoughtful in the volume." A third
development, Congress's adoption of the Attorney's Fees Award
Act 2 and its strict enforcement in the courts, 3 extended the fears of
municipal accountants to the same degree that it heightened the
hope of civil rights groups. John Witt covers that topic with con-
siderable skill and balanced judgment.
This five-year survey of developments under section 1983 is
complemented by two other topics covered by Sword and Shield.
First, essays by Mahoney, Rushing, and Bratcher and Jaron cover
the essentials of plaintiffs' prima facie case and defendants' im-
munities and defenses in terms which litigators will find informa-
tion. Substantive essays by Freilich, Manley, and Bley also discuss
an area of section 1983 litigation which has exploded in federal
courts in this time period, land use controls. 4 While inclusion of
these essays is very commendable, it points out the major limita-
tion of The Urban Lawyer's coverage and this book-the failure to
cover the other major substantive areas of concern to municipal
lawyers, primarily police misconduct cases 5 and procedural due
process problems relating to regulatory 6 and personnel decisions. 7
11. Manley, The Next Thirty Years of Civil Rights Litigation in SWORD AND
SHIELD, supra at 139, Cappalli, Federal Grants and the New Statutory Tort: State
and Local Officials Beware! in SWORD AND SHIELD, supra at 187. Cappalli's article
actually deals not with the "and laws" language of section 1983, but with the
related development of "implied" causes of action for damages. Reading Manley
and Cappalli together shows that, regardless of whether the damage claim is
implied directly from a federal supervisory statute or is collaterally created by
section 1983, the role of federal judicial oversight is essentially the same.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
13. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (Act applies to settlements and to
nonconstitutional as well as Constitution-based claims under section 1983); Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (fees may be awarded state even though not
explicitly covered by Act).
14. Freilich's piece in particular shows the substantial need for rethinking
section 1983's overlap with traditional state-court remedies. It is the most schol-
arly essay in the book.
15. See Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1983); Herrera v. Valen-
tine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981). Brewer exemplifies appellate courts' attempts
to deal with Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1980) (no section 1983 remedy for
property deprivation when postdeprivation remedy adequate in state court). The
cases may revolutionize police misconduct litigation under section 1983.
16. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (school residency regulations);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (billboard regulation
presents first amendment problems); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61 (1981) (regulation of nude dancing).
17. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (discharge for noncompliance
with grooming code); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (discharge
without a hearing).
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Section 1983 has been an intellectual enigma ever since Justice
Douglas in Monroe v. Pape stated that the section "should be read
against the background of tort liability which makes a man re-
sponsible for the natural consequences of his acts.""1 That unfor-
tunate bit of dictum spawned a style of thinking and a label-the
"constitutional tort" 9 which has threatened to skew section 1983's
proper development.
Monroe's facts and defendants' peculiar argument made the tort
analogy seem initially attractive. Defendant police officers had
violated not only federal constitutional law but also, by their own
confession, state law.20 Thus, the usual balancing of federal and
state interests which is at the core of virtually all traditional consti-
tutional law was hidden in Monroe: there could be no respect
given to state interests where the defendants conceded that they
violated state law.
Such misconduct cases, however, represent only one group of
section 1983 suits. The others are the traditional constitutional law
cases in which state or local officials have obeyed state law and the
question is not whether they behaved culpably as individuals, but
whether local interests should, in the constitutional balance, out-
weigh national interests.22 That decision-making process is fun-
damentally different from traditional tort analysis, and analogies
to traditional concepts of torts must be rejected for at least two
reasons.
These two reasons show the difference between tort law and
constitutional law. First, tort law usually balances the interests of
two private persons,23 whereas constitutional law balances private
18. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 171, 187 (1961).
19. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond,
60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965).
20. 365 U.S. at 172 n.6.
21. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 125 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("sliding scale"); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-9, 18, 559-631 (1978); cf. G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1318 (10th ed.) (balancing and free speech).
22. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (undocumented alien children's
educational rights); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state abortion laws,
substantive-due-process analysis at strict level of scrutiny). Indeed, these cases,
which often arise under section 1983, are the grist from which constitutional law
textbooks are compiled.
23. See Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock and Wilcox, 207 Wis. 209, 240
N.W. 392 (1932) (negligent manufacturing process); King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn.
217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918) (parent's liability for son's use of automobile). Of
course, the same is true for other areas of private law. See Hawkins v. McGee, 84
N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1921) (contract). Of course, the public's interest is reflected
interests and collective (or governmental) interests." Even when
tort law deals specifically with private suits against governmental
officers, as in false imprisonment cases,' constitutional law may be
different because it reestablishes the balance from the perspective
of federal supervisory goals.26 The degree to which a state may
make rules binding its officials derives from its appreciation of
local misconduct, state (or official) ability to pay judgments, or
perhaps even its willingness to have policy less effectively enforced
in fear of judgments. A federal decision on the same problem must
not only be made in view of national problems but also with due
regard for the facts that (1) states may have decided the issue
differently and (2) the efficacy of enforcement of general state
policies will be affected. This is not to say that a federal rule will be
narrower or less protective of individuals; it is simply recognition
that the federal act of balancing may reach a result different from
state law 27 -and unwarranted analogizing to state tort law subverts
the independent federal decision-making process.
Lurking beneath the surface of the resurgence of section 1983 in
Monell's official policy cases, therefore, is a replay of many of the
same issues of federal versus local control raised in the incorpora-
tion and other due process controversies earlier in this century.'
Talk of tort analogues tends to confuse courts' analyses of these
cases rather than aid them. 29
in the balance, but the competing persons have otherwise individual and equal
claims to have law reflect their interests.
24. See note 21 supra.
25. See, e.g., Garvin v. Muir, 306 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1957); Birdsall v. Lewis,
246 A.D. 132, 285 N.Y.S. 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936); Ulvestad v. Dolphin, 152
Wash. 580, 278 P. 681 (1921) (standards and defenses considered). Cf. Hill v. City
of Glenwood, 124 Iowa 479, 100 N.W. 522 (1904) (negligence-based tort; use of
sidewalk by blind person).
26. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (negligence standard applicable
under state law not adopted in prisoner's claim against doctor for improper
medical care); Jackson v. Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983) (duties applicable
under state tort law not applicable in section 1983 suit for constitutional depriva-
tion).
27. Cf. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (states may choose to be more protective on state
constitutional grounds).
28. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (per Cardozo, J.); New
State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. See Dollar v. Harralson County, 704 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1983) (judgment
"informed, although not controlled," by state law; little consideration of federal
constitutional considerations). Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969) (no
analysis of constitutional goals, federal interests, or institutional limitations).
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Sword and Shield provides a well-selected introduction to what
has become perhaps the most important and intellectually chal-
lenging area facing state and local governments-insuring that
their practices measure up to an evolving constitutional consensus
concerning federal minimum standards of care. The tendency of
many practitioners and judges has been to recycle their knowledge
of ordinary tort law and apply it to these new problems, but that
effort, like most easy solutions, cannot succeed.
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